

THE ECONOMY OF THE GIFT

Paul Ricoeur's Significance for Theological Ethics

John Wall

ABSTRACT

Paul Ricoeur's understanding of the relations of faith, love, and hope suggests a unique approach to theological ethics, one that holds fresh promise for bringing together considerations of the good (teleology) and the right (deontology) around the notion of an "economy of the gift." The economy of the gift articulates Ricoeur's distinctively dialectical understanding of the relation of the human and the divine, and the resulting dialectical moral relation of the self and the other. Despite our fallen condition, Ricoeur suggests, we are called by the divine to embrace the radical possibility of the reconciliation of human goods under the requirement of accountability to human diversity and otherness.

KEY WORDS: *evil, faith, hope, love, Paul Ricoeur*

PAUL RICOEUR IS NOT GENERALLY WELL KNOWN as a theological ethicist. He is best known for his theories of evil, hermeneutics, and narrative. However, over the course of his long career, Ricoeur has formulated a series of insights into theological ethics which, understood together and within the context of his larger *oeuvre*, add up to a unique moral perspective. Ricoeur's understanding of the relations of faith, love, and hope suggests an approach to theological ethics that holds fresh promise for bringing together considerations of the good (teleology) and the right (deontology). What is more, it does so on the basis of a uniquely dialectical understanding of the role of religion in ordinary moral experience and understanding. This theological ethics can be summarized, I will argue, in Ricoeur's recurrent phrase "the economy of the gift."

Unpacking the implications of Ricoeur's work for theological ethics is a worthwhile exercise for at least two reasons. First, Ricoeur's contributions in this domain are by no means obvious. Although the notion of an economy of the gift is found throughout his writings, it is not elaborated

I would like to thank Don Browning, William Schweiker, David Tracy, and the three anonymous referees for their invaluable help with these reflections.

systematically. (It does not derive, for example, from Marcel Mauss's identical phrase [Mauss 1924/1990].) This problem is compounded by the fact that over Ricoeur's fifty-year writing career (from the 1950s to the present), the focus of his theological ethical interests has shifted. Before the 1970s, he focused primarily on hope; then, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, he developed a moral dimension to his understanding of faith; finally, in the late 1980s and 1990s, he worked out a further ethics of love. The phrase "economy of the gift," construed in relation to his threefold conception of radical evil, is the hermeneutical key that will allow us to relate these terms to one another, even if Ricoeur himself does not always make these connections clear.

Second, and more important, Ricoeur's theological ethics, properly understood, provides new resources for addressing the fundamental conceptual problem of how to relate the good and the right. This problem has become increasingly pressing today, as we confront a world in which our power over one another is extended through new technologies and our economic and social lives take on ever more global proportions. In this context, we are faced with the task of understanding which images of the human good—which ends and purposes (*teloi*)—should be affirmed to guide our new powers and possibilities responsibly. At the same time, we need to know which, if any, notions of right—which senses of necessary duty or obligation (*deon*)—should be held up in the midst of increasing moral diversity. Are we forced to relativize our ideas about substantive human goods in order to preserve a necessary minimal respect for the diversity of persons? Or should we abandon the effort to secure generalizable moral principles in order to reaffirm the particular contexts in which we can find human meaning and purpose?

The problem of the relation of the good and the right has occupied recent theological (and philosophical) ethics with growing intensity. Important work in deontological theories of love, human rights, and the dignity of persons has increasingly been challenged by "post-liberal" approaches that seek a return to teleological concepts like the common good, the realization of traditional narratives, and the maintenance of historical communities. At the same time, these teleological and communitarian perspectives have come under attack from liberationist, some feminist, and other deontologically oriented approaches, which reassert basic human obligations, such as enhancing equality and protecting against oppression. Whereas once the distinction between teleological and deontological ethics coincided with a distinction between premodern and modern moral thought, by the close of the twentieth century, the relation of the two had become significantly more complex.

I will argue that Ricoeur suggests a uniquely fruitful way to integrate the teleological and deontological dimensions of theological ethics, one

that challenges contemporary theological ethics to move beyond traditional disputes about the primacy of goods versus rights in moral life. Ricoeur's concept of the economy of the gift indicates an *economy* in the sense of a dialectical *exchange* between the good and the right that is never resolved but rather rendered more or less *productive*. This economy describes an ethics of unfolding human transformation in relation to the divine. Out of faith in humanity's ultimate teleological goodness arises the deontological obligation to love one another. And out of this deontological obligation of love arises, in turn, a critical teleological hope for humanity's ultimate reconciliation. This economy of faith, love, and hope is a circular (or better, spiraling) exchange in which the good and the right both presuppose and transform each other.

Yet this economy is of a *gift*. The good and the right are integrated only on the *theological* grounds of humanity's encounter with God. Faith is the divine gift of our capacity to affirm our original created goodness despite our actual fallen human condition. Love, in turn, is the gift we are commanded and obligated to give to the other, even in the face of enmity. As Ricoeur puts it, "since it has been given you, give . . ." (Ricoeur 1991b, 198; 1987/1995b, 300). Finally, hope is the culminating divine gift of the possibility for ultimate human reconciliation despite its seeming impossibility. Hope is the teleological fulfillment of the faith that despite human evil and conflict the world is finally good. And it is at the same time an affirmation that love can ultimately be realized among us. This economy of the gift is thus a kind of pilgrimage ethic, or ethics of the way, that describes the *radical* nature of the human transformation required by the ends for which humanity is ultimately given.

As I unpack and analyze Ricoeur's diverse theological ethical writings, I hope to clarify his work in a way that will be helpful not only for other interpreters of Ricoeur but also for ethicists not well acquainted with his work. I will first examine the dialectical religious hermeneutics on which Ricoeur's economy of the gift is based. Then I will describe how I think Ricoeur relates the three key terms in this economy—faith, love, and hope—and how these terms integrate the good and the right into an ethics of human transformation and reconciliation. At the conclusion of this article, I will make some brief and tentative remarks about how Ricoeur's theological ethics might be situated with respect to the major contemporary alternatives of communitarianism, love ethics, and liberationism. My purpose is not to argue for the superiority of a Ricoeurian view, but to survey the new horizons in the study of theological ethics that I believe Ricoeur's writings helpfully and fruitfully open up.

1. A Dialectical Religious Hermeneutics

Ricoeur's use of the term "dialectics" should be distinguished from G. W. F. Hegel's notion of the dialectical movement in history of the objective spirit. Ricoeur critiques Hegel's dialectics as "absolutizing," in the sense that it raises finite human existence to infinite and universal significance (Ricoeur 1986/1991a). Ricoeur's is, instead, a dialectics between the complacent self-understanding of finite, fallen human beings and the radical critique provided by God's transcendent perspective. Teleology and deontology, faith and love, stand in productive tension with each other only because a dialectical tension already exists, in Ricoeur's view, between grace and humanity. Hope for human reconciliation is an aspiration never fully realized for us. It enables human life to be transformed in the direction of its ultimate possibilities, but it is not fully realized in this world because humanity has fallen from the original gift upon which the moral economy of the gift is primordially based. Theological ethics is an effort to put this economy of the gift back into motion in human affairs, all the while recognizing that humanity remains deeply estranged from its origins in God.

It is generally agreed that Ricoeur's dialectical religious hermeneutics takes something of a mediating position between the two great Anglo-European alternatives of the twentieth century, namely, Karl Barth's kerygmatic hermeneutics and Paul Tillich's correlational hermeneutics. As studies by Peter Joseph Albano (1987), David Stewart (1995), and Mark I. Wallace (1986) have shown, Ricoeur combines Barth's sense for the radical nature of "the strange world of the Bible" with Tillich's view that Scripture's meaning for us is shaped by the ultimate questions raised in our particular historical situation. Ricoeur criticizes Barth for insufficiently acknowledging that sacred texts, like all texts, are interpreted in relation to ordinary human understanding. The word of God disrupts, but it also reorients, ordinary human meaning. Ricoeur (implicitly) criticizes Tillich for assuming that sacred texts do not disrupt and disorient human understanding in strange, multiple, and radical ways. Rather than responding to a single "ultimate concern" of an age, religious hermeneutics challenges an age with a strange gift that no age can fully grasp.

According to Ricoeur's kerygmatic-correlational religious hermeneutics, the human understanding of the divine is at once a received response to God's prior gift of grace and a constructed interpretation of that strange gift from the point of view of the self's ordinary human world and particular situation. The person does not merely witness to the divine. The person also interprets the divine from the point of view of his or her particular situation. At the same time, the divine is not just a response to questions of human meaning. It is a gift that human meaning must

account for and respond to. In this sense, the biblical message remains, as in Barth's work, strange and particular, while also requiring, as in Tillich's work, interpretation into the person's present situation.

To see this, it is important to recognize that, for Ricoeur, religious hermeneutics is characterized by "limit-expressions" (Ricoeur 1979a; 1975/1991c; 1974/1995c). Limit-expressions are forms of language that evoke "limit-experiences" of the ultimate. As such, they radically disorient ordinary human understanding and, in the process, reorient it in relation to the mystery of the divine. Whereas *philosophical* hermeneutics has to do with the formation of the interpreter's own world of understanding (with what Hans-Georg Gadamer calls the "fusion of horizons"), *religious* hermeneutics involves a specific encounter with what is wholly other than the human—with a divine, rather than merely human, word (Gadamer 1960/1989, 306–7, 374; Ricoeur 1974/1995c, 59). A hermeneutics of limit-expressions is possible in Ricoeur in ways that a strictly Gadamerian hermeneutics does not as easily capture. Unlike Gadamer's, Ricoeur's hermeneutics—philosophical and religious alike—involves the "distanciation" of the interpreter's understanding through a structurally differentiated "world of a text" (Ricoeur 1975/1981, 141–44). Human understanding is constituted, Ricoeur claims, only insofar as prior understanding (or pre-understanding) passes through the "detour" of the hermeneutical arc of distanced textual structures. Here "textual" means any written, spoken, painted, or ritualized structure of language. The otherness of expressions of the divine is a radical and disorienting extension of Ricoeur's more general theory of the ontological otherness of the world of the text.

Ricoeur typically illustrates the radically dialectical nature of religious limit-expressions and limit-experiences by using Jewish and Christian Scriptures. For example, God commands Abraham to sacrifice his son Isaac, despite having promised Isaac to Abraham as his long-awaited heir. Jesus counsels his disciples to "turn the other cheek" even in the face of injustice. Christ is murdered on the cross and yet returns to life, resurrected. These and other limit-expressions found in sacred texts "transgress" and "rupture" ordinary human understanding with various kinds of "paradoxes and hyperboles" (Ricoeur 1974/1995c, 60). The Scriptures' stories, parables, and sayings are not meant, according to Ricoeur, to add up to some grand and unifying narrative of God's plan for the world. On the contrary, they "dissuade hearers in some way from forming a coherent project of their lives and from making their existence into a continuous whole" (Ricoeur 1974/1995c, 60). If anything, the Scriptures point to God's otherness and to the profoundly fallen state of ordinary human understanding. Here, one is reminded of Søren Kierkegaard's existential theology of "crisis and decision" and Karl Jaspers's transcendental theological experience of "distress" (Ricoeur 1970, 58; 1974/1995c, 61).

However, if, for Ricoeur, religious limit-expressions and limit-experiences disrupt and disorient, they also *reorient* human understanding toward its own ultimate possibilities. This does not mean that the divine is incorporated into a coherent world of meaning. Rather, it means that, on some level, religious hermeneutics succeeds in what Ricoeur calls "the naming of God" (Ricoeur 1979b, 220, 225–26), that is, it articulates the experience of that to which fallen humanity is *primordially* related. Naming God "dislocate[s] our imagination" so as to reorient it toward "the Wholly Other" (Ricoeur 1979b, 223; 1975/1991c, 99; 1974/1995d, 46). It raises the radical possibility of our own "new being" (Ricoeur 1975/1991c, 96–97). Examples of this kind of reorientation of human experience include Friedrich Schleiermacher's "feeling of absolute dependence" and David Tracy's "basic confidence and trust in the meaningfulness of existence" (Tracy 1975, 103), as well as, Ricoeur himself adds, a "culminating [experience of] supreme joy" (Ricoeur 1974/1995c, 61).

What is essential and unique to Ricoeur's theory of religious hermeneutics is that limit-expressions draw the interpreter into a *dialectical* relation to the divine. This dialectical relation is radically transformative of human understanding and experience. It ruptures and disorients ordinary human understanding through the appearance of grace in the world, but it also reorients human understanding around a closer sense for the person's own ultimate origins.

2. Faith as the Originary Affirmation of Goodness

This dialectical religious hermeneutics is the basis for various trajectories in Ricoeur's work on religious, spiritual, and sacred themes. One could even argue (though I do not have the space to do it here) that Ricoeur's view of the dialectical nature of our relation to the divine informs the dialectical character of his hermeneutical philosophy as a whole. With respect to ethics in particular, Ricoeur consistently suggests—despite frequently bracketing theological issues—that moral life and norms cannot finally be understood apart from their radical religious origins. It is this disorienting and reorienting dimension of moral life that Ricoeur's phrase "economy of the gift" attempts to capture (Ricoeur 1979a, 1985, 1990c, 1991b, 1987/1995b, 1974/1995d; LaCocque and Ricoeur 1998).

It is because our relation to the divine is dialectical and disruptive that theological ethics, according to Ricoeur, rests upon a certain kind of moral *faith*. In using faith as a *moral* term, Ricoeur is indicating that Christian ethics, for him, is not contained wholly in the command to love, even though love remains an important second moment. Nor does Ricoeur follow Immanuel Kant in limiting the theological dimensions of

ethics to hope (Kant 1788/1956, 128–36). That Ricoeur's theological ethics is primarily Kantian is commonly assumed in the secondary literature (Albano 1987; Dauenhauer 1986; Schweiker 1993; Vanhoozer 1990; Leeuwen 1981). However, a closer look suggests that love and hope are both contextualized within a more originary moral faith.

2.1 *Rethinking radical evil*

Moral faith, in Ricoeur, is, in fact, a *teleological* term. It is a response to a kind of "radical evil" in the human will that is more primordial than the deontological "radical evil" to which this phrase was first applied in Kant. According to Kant, radical evil explains the "inscrutable" [*unerforschbar*] nature of the "bad will" (Kant 1793/1960; Ricoeur 1985, 645). It is the nonrational origin of the human agent's tendency to fall short of the moral law despite being necessarily and essentially a morally rational creature. Ricoeur, however, follows the critique of Kant's understanding of the will made by the phenomenological tradition of G. W. F. Hegel, Edmund Husserl, and Martin Heidegger. He interprets the human "will" as *primordially* teleological, in the sense that it is oriented toward realizing human freedom in concrete intentional projects (Ricoeur 1950/1966, 1985, 647; 1995f, 569). The will, for Ricoeur, is not an abstract noumenal entity, but a concrete "capacity" to form one's various biological drives, affective desires, social contexts, and historical situations into aims and ends that have a coherent meaning and purpose (Ricoeur 1950/1966; 1995f). As Ricoeur put it in his early work, the will forms the fallible self's "disproportionality to itself" into a meaningful sense of personal direction and wholeness (Ricoeur 1965/1986, *xvii*, 1).

For Ricoeur, the radical evil at the origin of our teleological capacities can be described only in the negative sense of a human teleological "in-capacity" (Ricoeur 1990c; 1995f; 1999). Despite being capable of achieving many aims and goods in the world, the human being remains, at bottom, a fallen creature wracked by a fundamental *incapacity* to fully realize his or her *telos*. The most basic fact about fallen human nature is not that we do not follow rational moral maxims (Ricoeur 1987b; 1990/1992b, 171). Rather, it is that humanity's God-given ends and purposes can never, in this world, be completely understood or realized. "I now see evil," Ricoeur writes, "as the *incapacity belonging to the capable man*, the incapacity that does not abolish capability but presupposes it as the very thing that has ceased to be available to man as we know him historically" (Ricoeur 1995f, 569, emphasis added). We remain capable of making progress toward important human ends like happiness, social harmony, and communion with the divine, but this capacity in human history brings with it a corresponding incapacity to achieve those ends completely or fully.

Ricoeur relates this teleological radical evil to the fact that the human being is both an agent and a sufferer in human history. Whereas Kant was able to envision radical evil only as a dimension of human agency, Ricoeur argues that radical evil presupposes also a certain human passivity. Humanity's incapacity to fulfill its proper ends derives, in part, from "having been seduced by overwhelming powers and, consequently, . . . belonging to a history of evil, which is always already there for everyone" (Ricoeur 1985, 636–37). We are not just producers of evil but also "sufferers" in a vast historical cycle of failing to realize the fullness of humanity (Ricoeur 1969/1974b, 436). The human incapacity for self-realization includes the passive "nonpower of power, the nonfreedom of freedom" (Ricoeur 1969/1974b, 436). Radical evil is, in fact, more "inscrutable" than Kant imagined. It involves a lack at the very heart of human striving, desire, and existence.

2.2 *Faith as a response to radical evil*

How, then, does faith respond to this radical evil of the human incapacity for teleological realization? Faith is the limit-experience of an "ordinary affirmation" of one's capability in the face of one's fallen incapability (Ricoeur 1955; 1978b; 1990/1992b). Faith, as ordinary affirmation, is "the joyous affirmation of being-able-to-be, of the effort to be, of the *coratus* at the origin of ethics' very dynamic" (Ricoeur 1978b, 178). Subjectively speaking, faith is an "élan" or "desire to exist" that is experienced as more primordial than even the most overwhelming reality of incapacity and suffering (Ricoeur 1990a). Faith serves "to liberate (*déliver*) freedom . . . and as a consequence to put freedom back into motion, to restore its original dynamism to it" (Ricoeur 1978b, 189–90).

Theologically, faith is a divine gift. It is the gift of the experience of one's ultimate created goodness. This experience cannot be constructed by finite human understanding itself. Instead, faith is the acceptance of one's "radical dependence" on an "ordinary giving of existence" (Ricoeur 1991b, 197). This original gift is symbolized in Genesis 1:31: "And God saw everything that he had made, and behold, it was very good" (Ricoeur 1991b, 197; 1987/1995b, 298). Faith is the limit-experience of God as the very source and origin of our humanity. "In the end I do not know what man is. My confession to myself is that man is instituted by the word, that is, by a language which is less spoken by man than spoken to man. . . . Is not The Good News the instigation of the possibility of man by a creative word?" (Ricoeur 1978a, 237). The Creator God is not just a judge who rewards our adherence to duty, but, more primordially, "the source of everything that is good in creation, including our indignation against evil, our courage to bear it, and our feeling of sympathy towards victims" (Ricoeur 1985, 647).

Faith, in the end, affirms human beings as radically capable—despite, in this fallen world, being also incapable—of participating in God's purposes for humanity. Faith places ordinary human ends and aims within the larger dialectical context of the ultimate goodness of God's creation. God's gift of faith "*reanimates* this whole dynamism [of human life] beginning from its point of departure . . . [so that] the strategic level where the evangelical morality operates is precisely that of the [teleological] ethical intention" (Ricoeur 1978b, 189–90, emphasis in original). Faith reveals to us the primordial teleological capacity from which human goods originate. Faith opens up a "movement between naked and blind belief in a primordial 'I can,' and the real history where I attest to this 'I can'" (Ricoeur 1978b, 177).

Ricoeur believes that this grounding of theological ethics in a teleologically oriented faith is required by the dialectical nature of the relation between grace and humanity. Theological ethics cannot grasp God's *telos* for humanity in any direct and unmediated way. Even the Christ, who is God become human, is not a blueprint or narrative model for human life, since the divine can only enter our fallen world as a rupture and disorienting critique. My own view is that Ricoeur could do more to explain what kinds of goods an encounter with the divine throws before us. A dialectical relation to the divine should not so completely rupture our human sense of the good as to leave us drifting aimlessly. Nevertheless, Ricoeur performs a valuable service both in bringing the issue of radical evil back to the center of theological ethics and in insisting that the proper response to radical evil is a dialectical one of faith in the ordinary teleological goodness of humanity. From here, it seems to me, a new vision of theological ethics can be constructed that neither reduces religion to "the limits of reason alone" nor searches undialectically for direct knowledge of some ultimate divine plan.

3. Love as Command

If faith is the starting point of Ricoeur's theological ethics, it remains only the first moment in a larger moral economy of the gift. Faith in one's own given goodness is the occasion for the further possibilities of love and hope. Faith, love, and hope are not, for Ricoeur, elements in a grand Christian narrative into which we ought to fit our lives. Although faith points to a past gift of creation and (as we will see in section 4) hope points to our greater future possibilities, this does not mean that Christian life is first defined by participating in some world-historical story. Nor are faith, love, and hope intended to represent cardinal theological virtues, that is, expressions of true Christian character. Rather, they are three connected *limit-experiences* of our radically dialectical relation to the divine. Faith, love, and hope function to disrupt and disorient fallen

human understanding so that we may be liberated in the direction of our ultimate human possibilities.

Love arises out of faith, for Ricoeur, as a secondary *deontological* limit-experience. Love, in its distinctively theological sense, is strangely *commanded*. It is the command to give to others, just as one's own existence has been given as a gift from God. Ricoeur describes this new moment in the economy of the gift as a "logic of superabundance" (Ricoeur 1979a; 1990c, 395; 1991b, 198-200; 1987/1995b, 300-302; LaCocque and Ricoeur 1998, 124-33). The gift that has been given by God instigates a theological economy in which the self is then obliged to pass on this gift superabundantly to others. Far from being an impetus or permission for self-denial and self-mortification, the love command is a further expression of the faithful acceptance of the ultimate goodness of human existence, an affirmation of the self's primordial capacity to participate in God's radical superabundance.

3.1 *Deontological radical evil and the logic of equivalence*

To understand the logic of Ricoeur's treatment of the theological construct of love, one must understand that he posits a second form of pervasive radical evil. Although this form of radical evil is conceived in deontological terms, it still differs somewhat from the conception of radical evil developed by Kant. Whereas faith responds to our ultimate incapacity to realize our own teleological good, love responds to a corresponding radical deontological incapacity to respect others in their "genuine otherness" (Ricoeur 1990/1992b, 223-25, 339). On some level, despite even our best intentions, we never entirely escape using others for our own utilitarian interests. All our efforts to respect others are prey to a nondeontological "logic of equivalence" in which we calculate the "return" our actions will bring back for ourselves (Ricoeur 1979a, 4; 1990c, 395; 1991b, 198-99; 1987/1995b, 300). This utilitarian logic that undermines genuine respect is occasioned, not by a Kantian "bad will," but by our fallen human finitude. In our fallen state, we are incapable of grasping the full "singularity and nonsubstitutability of persons" (LaCocque and Ricoeur 1998, 131).

Although I cannot explore the argument fully here, Ricoeur criticizes the deontological ethicist John Rawls for failing to grasp the depths of this fallen human incapacity to overcome our utilitarian tendencies (Ricoeur 1990b). Rawls claims that we can move beyond utilitarian ethics by imagining ourselves in a fictional "original position" of impartiality toward others (Rawls 1999). According to Ricoeur, Rawls's project does not succeed because no such "original position" is humanly possible. The problem is not simply that human beings do not, in fact, generally manage to put aside their own interests; Rawls acknowledges this

in saying that the original position is a hyperethical construct. More profoundly, the problem, according to Ricoeur, is that human beings are radically and unalterably finite. We are simply not capable, by our own powers, of imagining all the relevant goods (particularly, but not only, those that conflict with our own) that should be considered from an impartial perspective.

This new deontological radical evil takes various concrete forms. In its starkest form, the logic of equivalence appears as vengeance or retribution: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Vengeance is an "original violence" that attempts to "equalize" a prior violation of goods with a calculated violence to the goods of the offender (Ricoeur 1992a, 23-24). Ricoeur argues that vengeance is a sign of radical evil even when the act avenged is the most violent of crimes. Thus, Ricoeur places in the category of radical evil even the understandable desire for vengeance against the Nazis after World War II (the same Nazis who, incidentally, held Ricoeur himself captive). The problem with vengeance as a basis for justice is that it obscures the need to recognize the Nazis' victims, especially the Jewish victims of the Holocaust, as "bearers of a lamentation that no explanation is able to mitigate" (Ricoeur 1989, 4). Vengeance purports to right the wrongs of the past by calculating an *equivalent* return of harm for the harm that has been done. But this derails the true task of justice, which is to restore the victims' dignity and singularity. The task of justice for the victims of the Nazis was (and is) to "reveal the murderers as murderers and the victims as victims" (Ricoeur 1989, 4). The desire for vengeance is human, but it obscures this more important task. "Are we not invited," Ricoeur asks, "to discern even in the most just punishment, the disquieting countenance of wrath and vengeance?" (Ricoeur 1979a, 6).

The logic of equivalence can also, more subtly, take the form of a calculated balance not of violence but of goods, what Ricoeur calls a "demand for reciprocity" (Ricoeur 1989, 4). In this case, justice is reduced to doing good "only for the sake of receiving a reward in return" (Ricoeur 1989, 4). Although gaining rewards is not wrong in itself, entering into exchanges for this purpose signals our incapacity to respect others fully as ends in themselves. The danger of justice devolving into a demand for reciprocity is contained, in Ricoeur's view, even in the classic deontological ethic of the Golden Rule: "Do to others as you would have them do to you" (Luke 6:31). The Golden Rule could be interpreted to recommend a mercenary calculation of the form, "I give so that you give" (Ricoeur 1990c, 395, emphasis in original; 1987/1995b, 300). It could be viewed as advice about getting ahead in this world. The problem turns on the meaning of the key word "as": "Do to others in the same loving manner as you would have them do to you" or "Do to others because you would have them do to you." As we will see, a utilitarian interpretation

of the Golden Rule is prevented in the Bible only by its being placed immediately after the radical command to "love your enemies" (Luke 6:27).

According to Ricoeur, the logic of equivalence takes two general forms in modernity. First, it shows itself in the philosophy of "utilitarianism" that has gained increasing acceptance in contemporary economics, law, and culture. At its worst, utilitarianism opens the door to a "process of victimization" in which "the maximization of the average advantage of the greatest number [comes] at the price of the sacrifice of a small number" (Ricoeur 1991b, 201). Economic life distorts justice when it becomes a network primarily for taking as much advantage of each other as we can. Criminal law degenerates into a "vengeance of society" when it turns its back on the "rehabilitation of the culpable" (Ricoeur 1979a, 6). The media are reduced to using consumers for their own gain when they are driven simply by commercial profit.

Second, modernity also witnesses to the calculating logic of political and cultural totalitarianism. Ricoeur offers totalitarianism as the strongest sign of the human tendency to make calculated use of other persons for aims and ends those persons themselves may not accept: "The true evil, the evil of evil, shows itself in false syntheses, i.e., in the contemporary falsifications of the great undertakings of totalization of cultural experience, that is, in political and ecclesiastical institutions. In this way, evil shows its true face—the evil of evil is the lie of premature synthesis, of violent totalizations" (Ricoeur 1969/1974b, 439). The starkest examples one might cite of totalitarianism today are fascism, certain forms of fundamentalism, Stalinism, tribalism, and nationalism. However, a calculating totalitarian logic is also implicit even in the most well-intentioned of social projects, such as welfare reform and the world-trade movement. This radical evil at the heart of moral life results from our finite incapacity to respect everyone's genuine otherness.

3.2 *The gift that engenders obligation*

The proper response to this logic of equivalence is not cynicism or selfishness. The Christian response ought rather to be a renewed commitment to a contrasting logic of superabundance, a commitment grounded in the personal limit-experience of divine love. Any concern for others' genuine otherness has to rupture and disorient our ordinary finitude and partiality. Christian love ought not to be understood as an emotion or a virtue, or in any other way confined within ordinary human experience or understanding. It must, instead, be understood to radically reorient our fallen logic of equivalence around the more primordial logic of God's superabundant gift.

Theological love is able to disorient our ordinary tendency toward utilitarianism because, according to Ricoeur, it is not a good to be

pursued (as is love in the ordinary meaning of the term), but a *command* to be obeyed. Theologically understood, love is not an emotion or a disposition, but an obligation. That love is commanded is attested to decisively in the Bible by what immediately precedes the Golden Rule: "But I say to you that hear, Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, pray for those who abuse you" (Luke 6:27–28, cited in Ricoeur 1991b, 197–98). This "hyperethical" command "transcends" ordinary morality by demanding that one recognize and respect the otherness of others in the most extreme possible way (Ricoeur 1990c, 395; 1991b, 197–98; 1987/1995b, 300–302). The command to love your enemies is a "corrective" to the Golden Rule. It insists that treating others as one would like to be treated means affording them the same "genuine otherness" one demands for oneself (Ricoeur 1990c, 395–97; 1991b, 197–98; 1987/1995b, 300). This deontological logic requires, Ricoeur argues, a "superabundance" akin to that expressed in Jesus' parable of the mustard seed that grows into a tree, Jesus' commands to "turn the other cheek" and to "be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect," and Paul's claim that "where sin increased, grace abounded all the more" (Ricoeur 1987/1995b, 300; 1979a, 4; 1990c, 396; Rom. 5:20, cited in Ricoeur 1990c, 396).

Love of others is commanded, not because it will bring a future equivalent reward, but because all human beings—even one's enemies—are originally created good. The love command raises to a deontological level the prior teleological experience of faith in humanity's primordial goodness. The specifically deontological moment in this economy of the gift rests upon the "anterior gift" of God's affirmation that all of humanity is part of God's creation (Ricoeur 1987a, 24). "Because [existence] has been given to you [by God], give in turn" (Ricoeur 1991b, 198; 1987/1995b, 300–302). The logic of superabundant love toward the other rests upon the prior logic of the always already superabundant gift that one has already received oneself. As Ricoeur puts it, "it is the gift which engenders the obligation" (Ricoeur 1987a, 24).

Our fallen incapacity for respecting genuine otherness is therefore resisted and turned around, Ricoeur argues, only through a still more primordial capacity for superabundant love. Through the radical limit-experience of God's love for us, we are able to catch the glimmer of a divine economy that reverses the ordinary devolution of human relations into utilitarian exchange. One could say, to speak metaphorically, that what Jesus reveals is the possibility of overturning the tables in the marketplace. The love command challenges ordinary deontological respect (as in the Golden Rule) to live up to the radical vision of genuine love for others in all their infinite otherness. "However difficult and interminable [a task] it may be," Ricoeur claims, love reorients human relations toward "a tenacious incorporation, step by step, of a

supplementary degree of compassion and generosity" (Ricoeur 1987/1995b, 300).

4. Hope as the Possibility for Reconciliation

If faith is the originating grounds of Ricoeur's theological ethics and love is the command to which these grounds give rise, then hope, according to Ricoeur, is theological ethics's culmination or final end. Ricoeur's conception of hope shares certain traits with the familiar Kantian postulate that we can hope for happiness in the afterlife as God's reward for obeying duty in this world (Kant 1788/1956, 128–36). It does synthesize teleology and deontology. However, Ricoeurian hope is not a philosophical postulate concerning what must be the case "within the limits of reason alone." Rather, it is the culminating limit-experience in the radical and disorienting economy of the gift. Specifically, hope establishes as the horizon of human moral experience the apparently impossible possibility that diverse and conflicting human goods can ultimately be reconciled.

4.1 *Radical evil as moral tragedy*

Ricoeur is not as clear as he could be about what it is in fallen human existence to which hope in fact responds. Faith, as we have seen, responds to the radical evil of our incapacity for ultimate goodness, and love, to the radical evil of our incapacity for genuine justice. Arguing by analogy, I would suggest that hope, as Ricoeur develops it, is best explained as a response to a third appearance of radical evil in the world, namely, our entrapment in moral *tragedy*. Ricoeur's understanding of moral tragedy is developed most systematically late in his career in *Oneself as Another*. Here, Ricoeur argues that the conflict of the good and the right places humanity in a tragic situation. In the book's single direct reference to religion, moral tragedy is referred to as a "theology of divine blindness" (Ricoeur 1990/1992b, 242, which also refers the reader to his much earlier *Symbolism of Evil* [Ricoeur 1960/1967, 218–26]). The moral tragedy is that human life has "mysterious depths of motivations that no analysis of moral intention can plumb" (Ricoeur 1990/1992b, 242). What we are tragically blind to is any convincing way in which the conflict of human aims and purposes may ultimately be overcome. We appear in this sense to be the mere playthings of the gods (Ricoeur 1960/1967, 218–26).

This tragedy of the radically conflicted nature of human life is the impetus for our need for moral hope. It is illustrated, according to Ricoeur, in Sophocles' play *Antigone*, in which the tragedy hinges on the major characters' all too human *incapacities*. Neither Creon nor Antigone is

finally capable of escaping the prison of their own "onesidedness," their "narrowness of angle of commitment" (Ricoeur 1990/1992b, 243, 249). Creon, King of Thebes, refuses to bury Antigone's dead brother because he was a traitor to the city; Antigone insists on her brother's proper burial because this is what one should do for members of one's family. Thus, while Creon pursues an end that he rightly believes serves the well-being of the city, Antigone pursues a directly conflicting end that she, also rightly, believes to be best for her family. The play would not be a tragedy if one or the other of these ends lacked merit; it would be a simple tale of good against evil. It is a tragedy because Antigone is driven by *her best intentions* to eventual suicide, and Creon is driven by *his responsibilities as king* to the point of his final lament: "O crimes of my wicked heart" (Sophocles 1990, line 1261; quoted in Ricoeur 1990/1992b, 242).

Antigone speaks to us not only because it is a dramatic and well-told story but also because it illustrates something tragic at the heart of human existence. Because Sophocles did not write within the context of Christian theology, he understood the fallen human condition as the human condition as such. However, from Ricoeur's perspective, the tragic dimension of human life, so effectively imaged in *Antigone*, represents a third form in which radical evil appears in a fallen world. Moral tragedy signifies the human incapacity to reconcile fully the conflict of human goods. No one person's view of what is good can claim the total perspective required to harmonize all legitimate but conflicting moral ends.

Ricoeur could have made this third appearance of radical evil clearer if he had connected it to radical evil in its two prior forms. In the first place, moral tragedy appears to rest upon a prior teleological incapacity in persons to know and realize their created human good. After the fall, persons lack the ultimate created perspective from which conflicting human goods may fully be judged. In the second place, tragedy appears to rest upon the further deontological incapacity to respect other persons in their full, genuine otherness. After the fall, persons lack the encompassing moral imagination to comprehend the vast and seemingly infinite diversity of human ends. The true depth of the tragedy of the human condition is, in the end, both teleological and deontological at once. It is the radical incommensurability of the fallen goods of persons estranged by their otherness.

4.2 *Hope and possibility*

The appropriate response to this desperate human tragedy, according to Ricoeur, is hope. Hope has to be more than a philosophical postulate because human understanding alone cannot draw us beyond the captivity of our onesidedness. For the same reason, hope should not be

reductively understood as a human virtue or emotion. Instead, hope constitutes a new kind of radical theological limit-experience. It escapes the ordinary and human through a disorienting and transformative encounter with the divine. At the same time, it replaces the "divine blindness" of Greek tragedy with the gift of a new divine teleological vision.

Hope responds to the profound tragedy of the conflict of human goods by reorienting ordinary human understanding toward the possibility of ultimate human reconciliation. Hope is the limit-experience, given by God, of the possibility for a greater purpose to fallen human conflict. Ricoeur describes hope by saying that it names God not only as the origin of created goodness and the giver of the command to love but also as "the source of *unknown* possibilities" (Ricoeur 1991b, 197-98, emphasis in original; 1987/1995b, 299). This "unknown possibility" is actual human reconciliation. It remains "unknown" because from our one-sided point of view, reconciliation appears to be an *impossible* possibility. Only the gift of hope makes this possibility real. It infuses human life with the "anticipation of a liberated and revived humanity" (Ricoeur 1979b, 227; see also 1991c, 101), a humanity "liberated" from one-sidedness and finitude and "revived" from incapacity. However impossible the reconciliation of conflicting goods may seem, we ought still to seek it.

The limit-experience of hope cannot be understood apart from the prior limit-experience of faith in the goodness of creation. The object of hope is not just *any* reconciliation of human ends, but the "restoration of a bond" among persons that will draw us toward our "new creation" (Ricoeur 1969/1974b, 438; 1985, 645; 1987/1995b, 299). On this level, hope is a teleological term that reconstitutes humanity's past created goodness as an "origin to be discovered" (Ricoeur 1985, 645).

[In hope] the symbol of creator is "repeated," but from the angle of *anticipation* and not just from that of remembrance. The God of beginnings is the God of hope. And because God is the God of hope, the goodness of creation becomes *the sense of a direction*. The predicate "good" attached to the process of creation returns enriched by the symbols of the gift of the Torah and the gift of the remission of sins [Ricoeur 1987/1995b, 299, emphasis added].

One illustration that Ricoeur provides of hope understood as a new "sense of direction" is the biblical exodus, where the wandering Israelites reconstitute their faith in the Creator God into a new sense of ultimate purpose and sacred community (Ricoeur 1974/1995d, 47).

At the same time, the limit-experience of hope also cannot be understood apart from the prior limit-experience of love. Hope is not just hope for a reconstituted teleological sense of human direction but also for a direction that is *deontologically* inclusive of genuine human otherness.

Hope is the experience of the radical possibility that love will give rise to a universal human community, despite the tragedy of human singularity and one-sidedness. Hope "aims at two opposed things: human totality and human singularity. I want both [in] their full and non-contradictory realization" (Ricoeur 1974c, 166). For Ricoeur, the paradigm that comes closest to this deontological dimension of hope is the Abrahamic covenant, which symbolizes, among other things, that God "has approached, has been revealed as He who is coming *for all*" (Ricoeur 1969/1974a, 404-6, emphasis added). The covenant is a sign of a new humanity in which all are included in a single redeemed nation. This possibility is given by God in the face of our and Abraham's actual situation of social fragmentation and discord. It is the promise of a possibility that, to us, appears impossible.

Ricoeur holds that hope finds its fullest expression in the symbols of the resurrection of Christ and the kingdom of God. Ricoeur considers Christ's resurrection to be less a historical event than a disorienting limit-expression. The significant "event" here is not in the past but in the present, in the "unknown possibilities" revealed to us.

It may be that Jesus himself does not know that he was the Christ. And it is the community that recognizes this and states it, established as it is on this nonknowledge. This brings me to say that I do not finally know what happened between the Cross and the Pentecost. . . . Does not the empty tomb signify the gap between the death of Jesus as elevation and his effective resurrection as the Christ in the community? [Ricoeur 1995/1998, 154]

Christ's resurrection symbolizes a radical new possibility for human life. It is "a new creation *ex nihilo*, that is, beyond death" (Ricoeur 1969/1974a, 406). Christ is the limit-experience *par excellence* of the possibility of God's return to earth.

According to Ricoeur, Christ's resurrection raises the radical possibility, specifically, of hope for the kingdom of God. In moral terms, the kingdom of God symbolizes the impossible possibility of reconciling genuinely other human ends and purposes. It draws the one-sidedness or singularity of human beings into a reconciled human totality (Ricoeur 1974c, 166). This is not a kingdom that Ricoeur believes can be fully realized on earth. Ordinary human relations remain fallen and finite. However, the kingdom of God *can* be realized in this world insofar as it *transforms* human relations under the limit-experience of hope. Despite the impossibility of our bringing all human goods into an inclusive social order, we can be moved by the radical experience of hope to transform human relations in the direction of ever greater reconciliation. (As Johannes van der Ven points out, the hope for reconciliation, in Ricoeur, implies also a kind of "forgiveness" [Ven 1998, 282, referring to Ricoeur 1995e]).

Finally, hope, as symbolized in the resurrection and the kingdom of God, draws together teleological faith and deontological love. Hope is teleologically oriented because it follows from faith in humanity's original created goodness. The resurrection and the kingdom of God signify the possibility that God's good creation will be realized despite the fallenness of ordinary human life. The kingdom of God, in particular, is the radical vision of a harmonious humanity united around its primordially given aims and purposes. But hope raises faith to a *critical* moral level by including, also, the deontological requirement of love. One hopes not just for one's own entry into God's kingdom but also for the realization of God's kingdom among all of God's creatures. One hopes for the reconciliation of human difference, the synthesis of human otherness, in a universally inclusive human community. The good and the right can be realized together only insofar as we take up the radical task of human reconciliation.

5. Ricoeur and Contemporary Theological Ethics

To support my thesis that Ricoeur presents us with a powerful theological ethics that relates the good and the right around a divine economy of faith, love, and hope, I will close by briefly situating his work in relation to some significant theological ethical options available today. The purpose of this concluding exercise is not to demonstrate Ricoeur's superiority over other contemporary views (such a task is obviously beyond the limits of this article), but only to show how contemporary moral theology might benefit from Ricoeur's new way of addressing the question of the relation of the good and the right. It will also be possible to raise some critical questions about Ricoeur's own project.

5.1 *Communitarian ethics*

In the first place, Ricoeur's theological ethics shares several traits with the diverse recent movement sometimes referred to as communitarianism. According to Stanley Hauerwas, a preeminent communitarian theological ethicist, "the individual Christian's character is formed by his association with the *community* that embodies the language, rituals, and moral practices from which this particular form of life grows" (Hauerwas 1975, 210, emphasis added). Hauerwas is a particularly interesting writer to compare with Ricoeur because Hauerwas also rests theological ethics upon a divine *gift*. "To learn to be God's creatures means we must learn to recognize that our existence and the existence of the universe itself is a gift" (Hauerwas 1983, 27). Ricoeur and Hauerwas further agree that the proper starting point of theological ethics is the person's finite historical and communal situation, and

that ethics ultimately rests on faith—faith in the created goodness of our given forms of human life and community.

From a communitarian point of view, Ricoeur could in fact be accused of paying insufficient attention to the development of the Christian church as an ongoing witness to faith, including the church's particular historical and theological development beyond the Scriptures themselves. By understanding faith as a limit-experience, Ricoeur may over-emphasize the disorienting function of Scripture and de-emphasize the ways in which the Christian traditions have reoriented human life toward the divine in consistent and historically coherent narratives. It is left somewhat to the imagination what Ricoeur believes the gift of faith concretely adds up to in terms of specifically Christian goods and practices.

However, Ricoeur makes the important point that whatever specific forms of community the Scriptures give rise to, these communities can represent only finite and provisional understandings of God's ultimate intentions. Christian narratives and communities should remain always open to the divine gift in its capacity to radically disorient us. The "evil of evil," according to Ricoeur, lies in the creation of "false syntheses" or "totalizations" of the meaning of human life (Ricoeur 1969/1974b, 439). No community of persons, no matter how close they believe themselves to be to expressing God's intentions in their lives, can legitimately claim sufficient perspective to know God's narrative or plan as such.

This claim is the force of Ricoeur's insistence, in contrast to Hauerwas, that faith requires a secondary *deontological* moment of love for all of humanity in its diverse and unfathomable genuine otherness. Human finitude, for Ricoeur, does not suggest only our situatedness within particular historical communities, but also, and more radically, our obligation to be open to genuine otherness. The Christian community, on Ricoeur's account, is less the expression of God's kingdom in the narrative of the church than the place where hope for God's kingdom is kept alive despite humanity's fallen conflict and estrangement. This is why Ricoeur insists that faith in the goodness of God is not, alone, sufficient for human reconciliation in God's church. It is the supplementary command to love that prevents us from absolutizing any particular historical community. Our fallen condition requires a deontological element in theological ethics: a demand that we ever more radically love humanity in its diverse and unfathomable genuine plurality. Our sacred obligation is to generate human narratives that will be ever more inclusive of the miraculous diversity of human life. The Christian narrative must remain perpetually open to radical transformation in the face of the other.

5.2 *Ethics of love*

This openness to the other in Ricoeur's theological ethics brings Ricoeur close, also, to a tradition of reflection that has centered on the ethics of love. This tradition has had diverse manifestations in the past century, emphasizing such things as sacrificial love (Niebuhr 1949; Nygren 1930/1982), equal regard (Janssens 1977; Outka 1972), and feminist notions of mutual responsibility (Andolsen 1981; Gudorf 1985). Ricoeur shares with this tradition the conviction that each and every person must be respected because each possesses radical dignity as a creature of God. In contrast with communitarian ethics, this deontological love ethics more carefully accounts for the genuine singularity of each person. Perhaps its most radical form—which Ricoeur explicitly affirms—is found in Emmanuel Lévinas's ethics of the command of the face of the other (Lévinas 1947/1987).

Here again, one finds reasons to be critical of Ricoeur's project. Although some feminists have found in Ricoeur an ally in the search for an egalitarian deontological ethics (Anderson 1993; Nussbaum 1999), one is struck by Ricoeur's failure to use the term "equality" (and, indeed, by his labeling of the radical evil at the heart of deontological ethics a "logic of equivalence"). As we have seen, Ricoeur believes that a radical love for genuine otherness is necessary in order to resist the fallen human tendency to reduce equality to a mere utilitarian exchange. Nevertheless, as some feminists have argued, fallen human beings might also have the problem of putting others' goods too much ahead of their own. In this case, love for the genuine otherness of every member of humanity should clearly and explicitly include love for the genuine otherness, also, of oneself. Ricoeur's ethics might better acknowledge this two-sided nature of love if he affirmed not only genuine otherness but also genuine equality.

Despite this, Ricoeur's contribution to love ethics is to insist that the deontological norm of respect for genuine otherness (or genuine equality) can arise only out of a prior teleological affirmation of humanity's radical goodness. By treating love as a secondary moment in a larger economy of the gift, he shows that theological ethics can address the problems of inequality and domination only by also addressing the deeper problem of what constitutes the human good. Ricoeur thus provides a way of addressing a standard critique of the deontological point of view. Any norm for adjudicating conflicts of goods, as Hegel classically points out in his critique of Kant, must presuppose a prior vision of the good as such. For Ricoeur, the problem of love is not just inequality, but, more profoundly, our incapacity to affirm the good beneath all human strivings, no matter how fallen and imperfect those strivings may be. Moreover, love implies a further teleology of hope. Love is not fulfilled

in merely respecting others in their differences or treating everyone equally, but in the unfolding task of working to bring about an ever more radically reconciled humanity.

5.3 *Liberation theology*

The culmination of Ricoeur's theological ethics in hope suggests, finally, a certain congruence with liberation theology. Ricoeur can join Gustavo Gutiérrez in affirming, as theology's true task, the cultivation of "the openness of humankind and history to the future promised by God" (Gutiérrez 1971/1973, 173). Like Ricoeur (and Hauerwas), Gutiérrez bases moral life on a "gift of God" (Gutiérrez 1971/1973, 3). More specifically, he, like Ricoeur, views hope as a radical demand from God for the disruption of ordinary human praxis. It reorients the fallen human situation around "a new, just, and comradesly society . . . [namely] the Kingdom of God" (Gutiérrez 1971/1973, 12). Indeed, Ricoeur echoes liberationist themes explicitly in defining the object of hope as a "liberated and revived" human order (Ricoeur 1979b, 227; 1991c, 101) and in claiming that working in hope toward the kingdom of God is the only way, finally, to fulfill the command to love.

Liberation theologians like Gutiérrez might well criticize Ricoeur for disregarding the sense in which hope is a response to structured political oppressions. Although Ricoeur does argue that hope is a response to a radical evil in fallen humanity, he construes radical evil as the tragedy of the ultimate incommensurability of finite human goods. In contrast, liberation theology is oriented around the political problem of social poverty and oppression (Gutiérrez 1971/1973, 29–33). Ricoeur does not adequately recognize that the radical evil to which hope is a response may not be just the tragedy of human difference but also the fact that human difference gives rise to marginalization and the abuse of power.

In return, however, Ricoeur suggests that hope should rest on a prior affirmation of humanity's created goodness. It is impossible to hope for a liberated kingdom without having faith that, despite our fallen condition, we are all ultimately created good. Liberation theologians do not deny this. However, they tend to define the human good from the point of view of the kingdom to come, thus suggesting that the present human condition can tell us little about what the future kingdom of God should actually look like. Once the liberation arrives, what are the goods around which human life will concretely be organized? Like communitarians, Ricoeur can provide something of an answer to this question by affirming that the accumulated goods of one's traditions—such as, in the West, peace, meaningful work, and marriage—contain a certain wisdom in which it is legitimate to place some faith. Our accepted intuitions concerning the human good should be trusted as ethics's proper point of

departure. Ricoeur will always qualify such goods with the deontological requirement of love for persons' genuine otherness. However, unless we take such goods as starting points for moral discourse, the hoped-for kingdom of God will not find concrete expression. What is radical about hope is not just that it overturns the structures of our fallen world, but, more profoundly, that it demands the *transformation* of these structures in the direction of humanity's ultimate reconciliation.

These reflections on Ricoeur's relation to other positions remain cursory and in need of much further development. They are intended only as starting points for constructive conversation. However, I hope I have been able to indicate both what makes Ricoeur's position distinctive and what particular theological ethical tools Ricoeur may provide for the task of relating the good and the right. A renewed conversation about the possibilities for critical human reconciliation is much needed in addressing today's issues of globalization, cultural pluralism, and the expansion of technological and economic power. Ricoeur suggests that we can tackle these issues with both an appreciation for existing human ends and forms of community and a commitment to the ever greater inclusiveness of genuine human difference. In a time when the project of modernity has failed in its promise to defeat poverty, exploitation, and war, and has given rise instead to both moral cynicism and savage utopian social impulses, Ricoeur refuses to join the prevailing Jeremiahs who denounce moral fragmentation, and instead offers us a thoughtful and critical vision of hope. The economy of the gift promises a way to move beyond putatively competing moral logics toward a more highly inclusive moral vision characterized by the larger task of radical human reconciliation.

REFERENCES

- Albano, Peter Joseph
1987 *Freedom, Truth, and Hope: The Relationship of Philosophy and Religion in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America.
- Anderson, Pamela Sue
1993 *Ricoeur and Kant: Philosophy of the Will*. Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press.
- Andolsen, Barbara
1981 "Agape in Feminist Ethics." *Journal of Religious Ethics* 9.1 (Spring): 69-83.
- Dauenhauer, Bernard
1986 *The Politics of Hope*. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg
1989 *Truth and Method*. 1960. 2d ed., rev. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. New York: Crossroad.
- Gudorf, Christine E.
1985 "Parenting, Mutual Love, and Sacrifice." In *Women's Consciousness, Women's Conscience*, edited by Barbara Hilkert Andolsen. Christine E. Gudorf, and Mary D. Pellauer, 175-91. New York: Harper and Row.
- Gutiérrez, Gustavo
1973 *A Theology of Liberation*. 1971. 15th anniversary edition. Translated by Sister Caridad Inda and John Eagleson. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books.
- Hauerwas, Stanley
1975 *Character and the Christian Life: A Study in Christian Ethics*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
1982 *A Community of Character*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
1983 *The Peaceable Kingdom: A Primer in Christian Ethics*. Notre Dame Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Janssens, Louis
1977 "Norms and Priorities of a Love Ethic." *Louvain Studies* 6:219-30
- Kant, Immanuel
1956 *Critique of Practical Reason*. 1788. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
1960 *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*. 1793. Translated by T. M. Green and H. H. Hudson. New York: Harper.
- LaCocque, André, and Paul Ricoeur
1998 *Thinking Biblically: Exegetical and Hermeneutical Studies*. Translated by David Pellamer. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Leeuwen, Theodore M. van
1981 *The Surplus of Meaning: Ontology and Eschatology in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Rodopi.
- Lévinas, Emmanuel
1987 *Time and the Other*. 1947. Translated by Richard A. Coher Pittsburgh, Pa.: Duquesne University Press.
- Mauss, Marcel
1990 *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*. 1924. Translated by W. D. Halls. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Niebuhr, Reinhold
1949 *The Nature and Destiny of Man*. 2 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Nussbaum, Martha
1999 "Ricoeur on Tragedy: Teleology, Deontology, and Phronesis." Paper presented at the conference on Ethics and the Meaning of Public Life: Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought, at the University of Chicago Divinity School, Chicago, Ill. Scheduled for

- publication in *The Moral Capacity: Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought*, edited by John Wall, David Hall, and William Schweiker (New York: Routledge, 2002).
- Nygren, Anders
1982 *Agape and Eros*. 1930. Translated by Philip S. Watson. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Outka, Gene
1972 *Agape: An Ethical Analysis*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Rawls, John
1999 *A Theory of Justice*. Revised edition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Ricoeur, Paul
1955 "Morality without Sin or Sin without Moralism?" *Cross Currents* 5.4 (Fall): 339-52.
1966 *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*. 1950. Translated by Ezrim V. Kohak. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
1967 *The Symbolism of Evil*. 1960. Translated by Emerson Buchanan. Boston: Beacon Press.
1970 "Hope and the Structure of Philosophical Systems." In *Philosophy and Christian Theology*, edited by George F. McLean, O.M.I., and Jude P. Dougherty, 55-69. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. 44. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America.
1974a "Freedom in the Light of Hope." 1969. Translated by Robert Sweetney. In *The Conflict of Interpretations*, edited by Don Ihde, 402-24. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
1974b "Guilt, Ethics, and Religion." 1969. In *The Conflict of Interpretations*, edited by Don Ihde, 425-39. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
1974c "The Project of a Social Ethic." In *Political and Social Essays*, edited by David Stewart and J. Bien, 160-75. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press.
1978a "The Language of Faith." In *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work*, edited by Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart, 237-38. Boston: Beacon Press.
1978b "The Problem of the Foundation of Moral Philosophy." *Philosophy Today* 22.3-4 (Fall): 175-92.
1979a "The Logic of Jesus, the Logic of God." *Criterion* 18.2 (Summer): 4-6.
1979b "Naming God." *Union Seminary Quarterly Review* 34.4 (Summer): 215-27.
1981 "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation." 1975. In *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, edited and translated by John B. Thompson, 131-44. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 1984 *Time and Narrative*. Vol. 1. 1983. Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- 1985 "Evil, a Challenge to Philosophy and Theology." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 53.4 (December): 635-48.
- 1986 *Fallible Man*. 1965. Translated by Charles A. Kelbley. New York: Fordham University Press.
- 1987a "Le philosophe dans la cite: Paul Ricoeur, du texte à l'action." *Le Monde* 44.13191 (27 juin): 1, 24.
- 1987b "The Teleological and Deontological Structures of Action: Aristotle and/or Kant?" In *Contemporary French Philosophy*, edited by A. Phillips Griffiths, 99-111. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 1989 "The Memory of Suffering." *Criterion* 28.2 (Spring): 2-4.
- 1990a "L'Éthique, la morale, et la règle." *Autre temps, les cahiers du Christianisme social* 24 (février, hiver): 52-59.
- 1990b "On John Rawls' A Theory of Social Justice: Is a Pure Procedural Theory of Justice Possible?" *International Social Science Journal* 42 (November): 553-64.
- 1990c "The Golden Rule: Exegetical and Theological Perplexities." *New Testament Studies* 36:392-97.
- 1991a "Hegel and Husserl on Intersubjectivity." 1986. In *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II*, translated by Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson, 227-45. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
- 1991b "Love and Justice." In *Radical Pluralism and Truth: David Tracy and the Hermeneutics of Religion*, edited by Werner G. Jeanrond and Jennifer L. Rilke, 187-202. New York: Crossroad.
- 1991c "Philosophical Hermeneutics and Biblical Hermeneutics." 1975. In *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II*, translated by Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson, 89-101. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.
- 1992a "L'acte de juger." *Esprit* 183 (juillet): 20-25.
- 1992b *Oneself as Another*. 1990. Translated by Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- 1995a "The Bible and the Imagination." 1981. In *Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination*, edited by Mark I. Wallace, 144-66. Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press.
- 1995b "Ethical and Theological Considerations on the Golden Rule." 1987. In *Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination*, edited by Mark I. Wallace, 293-302. Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press.
- 1995c "Manifestation and Proclamation." 1974. In *Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination*, edited by Mark I. Wallace, translated by David Pellauer, 48-67. Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press.

- 1995d "Philosophy and Religious Language." 1974. In *Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination*, edited by Mark I. Wallace, 35-47. Minneapolis, Minn.: Fortress Press.
- 1995e "Reflections on a New Ethos for Europe." *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 21.5/6:3-13.
- 1995f "Reply to Patrick L. Bourgeois." In *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn, 567-70. Chicago: Open Court.
- 1998 *Critique and Conviction: Conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de Launay*. 1995. Translated by Kathleen Blaney. New York: Columbia University Press.
- 1999 "Response." Paper presented at the conference on Ethics and the Meaning of Public Life: Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought, at the University of Chicago Divinity School, Chicago, Ill. Scheduled for publication in *The Moral Capacity: Paul Ricoeur and Contemporary Moral Thought*, edited by John Wall, David Hall, and William Schweiker (New York: Routledge, 2002).
- Schweiker, William
1993 "Imagination, Violence, and Hope: A Theological Response to Ricoeur's Moral Philosophy." In *Meanings in Texts and Actions: Questioning Paul Ricoeur*, edited by David Klemm and William Schweiker, 205-25. Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia.
- Sophocles
1990 *Antigone*. Adapted by Bertolt Brecht, based on the German translation by Friedrich Hölderlin. Translated into English by Judith Marlina. New York: Applause Theatre Book Publishers.
- Stewart, David
1995 "Ricoeur on Religious Language." In *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, edited by Lewis Edwin Hahn, 423-42. Chicago: Open Court.
- Tracy, David
1975 *Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology*. Minneapolis, Minn.: The Seabury Press.
- Vanhooser, Kevin J.
1990 *Biblical Narrative in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: A Study in Hermeneutics and Theology*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Ven, Johannes A. van der
1998 *Formation of the Moral Self*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
- Wallace, Mark I.
1986 "The World of the Text: Theological Hermeneutics in the Thought of Karl Barth and Paul Ricoeur." Ph.D. diss., The University of Chicago Divinity School.